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Germen militiae: War and German Identity in the Later Middle Ages1 
 
by 
 
Len E. Scales 
 
 
You know, there are things that people of your generation and mine ought never to 
forget. We've been through the war and we know perfectly well what the Germans are 
like … and how national character basically doesn't change.2 
 
Students of the history of political ideas are wont to regard national stereotypes with some 
disdain. Medievalists, despite – indeed, no doubt partly on account of – their current 
infatuation with all aspects of the medieval 'nation', are in this respect no different. The fact 
that stereotyped utterances about various European realms, regions, settlements, and their 
populations are common in medieval writings has not, of course, gone unnoticed.3 On the 
whole, however, their occurrence has not been found especially illuminating. Instead, it is 
their intellectual vacuity and dull predictability that tend to be stressed – when they are 
scrutinized at all.4 The instinctive distaste of most scholars for prejudice masquerading as 
eternal truth often shows through, and there are specialists in the field who roundly insist that 
cataloguing mere 'topoi of differentiation' is no part of the proper business of the historian of 
identities.5 Where collective stereotypes have attracted interest, it has been as potential 
evidence for the consolidation of the communities which applied them or became their 
subjects. The early growth of the nation, some have thought, can in a rough-and-ready way be 
traced by charting their proliferation.6 A major context for this has often been found in the 
growth of secular government during the later Middle Ages and in the emergence of a new 
sort and scale of warfare.7 A natural concomitant, it is argued, was the elaboration and 
diffusion in the warring kingdoms of an unreflective, easy-to-use armoury of clichés of self-
congratulation and of vilification for neighbours and enemies.8 No account of the cultural 
impact of the Hundred Years War is now complete without a glance at the language of 
mutual insult which produced images of the proud, stiff-necked French and of drunken, 
loutish (and tailed) Englishmen abroad.9 War made nations, and thus it was soon nations, 
decked out in a new, cheap and gaudy, rhetorical finery, that were making war. Stereotypes 
had a central place in the parchment call-to-arms, clustering thickest around those peoples 
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which, in an age of organized violence, went to war most often, most ruthlessly, and to most 
devastating effect. 
 Not only common sense but also the relationship between war and stereotype familiar 
from the more recent past seems to support this view: the conspicuously aggressive become 
nature's aggressors.10 But whatever stimulates the proliferation of stereotypes in the first 
place, there is another aspect to their existence that calls for explanation: their habit of 
lingering, even in the utterances of the educated, long after the circumstances which may 
once have nourished them appear to have passed.11 The fact that in the closing decades of the 
twentieth century, after nearly fifty years of peace and stability, the Germans could still on 
occasion figure in the political rhetoric of the well-briefed as Europe's prime warmongers and 
overlords-in-waiting alerts us to a lesson which medievalists in particular might take to heart: 
that there is more to national stereotypes than meets the eye. Far from being mere substitutes 
for thought, stereotypes can overlie and encode complex webs of ideas, assumptions, and 
controversies. If that observation holds good for modern national labels, it is unquestionably 
still more applicable to medieval ones, which were deployed within a society where literate 
political discourse relied to a peculiar degree upon inherited literary models and rhetorical 
techniques. An examination of medieval stereotypes soon reveals that, like their modern 
counterparts, they were contentious and contested, serving above all as devices with which to 
argue. Yet the meanings which they bore could be multiple and ambiguous, their functioning 
within discourses of identity and power less self-evident than is often supposed – as this 
paper endeavours to show, by examining some of the contexts and conjunctions within which 
one well-known stereotype was deployed. 
 
I 
 
The history of the association between the Germans and war can be, and on occasion has 
been, made to appear both long and continuous.12 John of Salisbury, writing soon after the 
middle of the twelfth century, posed what was to become a celebrated rhetorical question 
when he demanded to know who set up the Germans – 'this brutish and unruly people' – as 
judges over the nations of the earth.13 Such has been the modern resonance of his words that 
some years ago a former president of the Monumenta Germaniae Historica felt the need to 
insist, before an audience of American academics, that the turbulent history of the medieval 
Reich may have explanations more complex than the German character traits identified by 
John.14 Read in their twelfth-century context, however, his remarks seem understandable 
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enough. So too does the proud boast of Gottfried of Viterbo, a member of Barbarossa's 
chancery, and John's contemporary, that 'German swords' could 'move earth and sea'.15 Both 
reflections originate, after all, in the heyday of imperial power under the Hohenstaufen, in a 
time of military assertiveness by the Empire's German rulers. By as early as the eleventh 
century, the Germans had already won a reputation both for physical courage and, in the view 
of their Italian neighbours and victims, for ruthless violence.16 The associations suggested in 
these instances – between war, the shaping of political identities, and their encapsulation in 
group stereotypes – thus appear to be familiar ones: broadly, those which have been traced in 
other European realms during the later Middle Ages. 
As everyone knows, however, the German case is special, for the days of imperial 
glory were numbered. The history of German military triumph was in fact markedly 
discontinuous, and did not lead, before the nineteenth century, to those processes of political, 
institutional, and ideological consolidation around a nascent 'national' monarchy so often 
detected in other parts of late medieval Europe. It therefore comes as something of a surprise, 
at the beginning of the sixteenth century, still to encounter utterances which seem more 
properly to belong in the age of Barbarossa – such as Heinrich Bebel's assurance, proffered to 
King Maximilian in 1501, that 'few peoples in the world have not, at one time or another, felt 
the sharpness of German swords or have at least trembled at the terror of our name'.17 But the 
militant patriotism characteristic of educated Germans on the eve of the Reformation is well 
enough known, and it has generally been ascribed its own, particular and immediate, 
causes.18 Alongside a strengthening anti-papal current, which itself nourished a keener 
interest in the triumphs and tragedies of Germany's imperial past,19 an important new element 
has been identified in the writings of Tacitus on the ancient Germans, rediscovered during the 
second half of the fifteenth century.20 There, German humanists thought they found a contrast 
marked out which spoke directly to their most urgent anxieties and grievances: between the 
plain warrior virtues of their own putative forebears and the decadent vices of the Latin south. 
On one view, modern stereotypes associating the Germans with a certain kind of harsh, 
military primitivism have their origin in perceptions forged in the time of Erasmus and 
Luther.21 
'Everything should be tried before iron. That is the view of the doctors, and emperors 
too have learned it by experience.' These words, put into the mouth of Charles IV, were 
written in 1351 in reply to the poet Petrarch, who had called on Charles to come into Italy 
and restore the ancient majesty of the Roman Empire.22 They appear not only to characterize 
well Charles's own approach to rulership (during a thirty-two-year reign as king and emperor 
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he did not involve himself in a single major war), but also to encapsulate aspects of late 
medieval imperial government more generally.23 The two centuries that lay between the end 
of the Hohenstaufen dynasty and the consolidation of the Habsburgs on the imperial throne 
offer scant support for a vision of German military grandeur. It was not merely the fact that 
the Empire's dwindling resources compelled a more limited, and pacific, style of rule than in 
times past. The whole standing of German arms appears diminished: by a series of military 
debâcles against the Bohemian Hussites, for example; or by the standing reproach 
represented by the advance into Europe of the Ottoman Turks.24 
Far from withering away, however, images of German military valour, warrior 
kingship, and restless, untameable bellicosity proliferated in writings of this period as never 
before, as they came to be woven in new, fundamental ways into the fabric of German 
constitutional and political debate. Not only that: assertions of Teutonic military supremacy 
appear to cluster especially in the troubled century between Frederick II's death in 1250 and 
the imperial coronation, in 1355, of the Luxemburger Charles IV – a century which one 
recent historian of the German monarchy has labelled the age of 'small kings', rulers 
distinguished by their modest means and narrow horizons.25 'Just as there is a time of peace 
and a time of war', reflected the publicist Alexander of Roes, writing in 1281, 'so also there 
are men destined for peace and men destined for war'.26 First among the latter, Alexander 
insisted, were his own German fellow-countrymen. Half a century later another German, 
Conrad of Megenberg, explained how his people owed their name itself to their innate 
military capabilities: they were a germen milicie – a 'race of warriors'.27 Nor was it only 
learned and semi-learned treatise-writers who continued to harp on the theme of German 
bellicosity. Similar ideas are found not only among the chroniclers but also in the language of 
the imperial chancery.28 The very gravity of the crises facing the Empire seemed in the eyes 
of some to call for a reawakening of the stern warrior aptitudes of its German bearers – a 
perception which underlies Alexander of Roes' demand that the prince-electors raise to the 
imperial throne 'a German knight … just like Charlemagne'.29 The persistence, and 
amplification, of such ideas in an age which seemed to contemporaries, no less than modern 
scholars, so marked by crisis, instability, and contraction in German political life requires an 
explanation. The interest of such an explanation lies in its potential to illuminate not only the 
historical development of ideas linking the German people with war, but also the relationship 
between medieval identities, stereotyping, and political power more generally. 
 
II 
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 Any approach to the network of motifs associating the Germans with war must, however, 
begin by recognizing something too often overlooked in the current pursuit of the medieval 
'nation': that the mix of ideas, assumptions, and sentiments which made up political identities 
in the Middle Ages varied between different peoples; and that, consequently, the stereotypes 
into which such identities were condensed also differed, in their resonances, connections, and 
implications. The medieval Empire was not like other European kingdoms, and the 
relationship which the German people was during the late Middle Ages held to have with 
imperial power was likewise distinctive. The professed ideals of the Christian Roman Empire 
had traditionally been militant: since the fifth century, prayers for the emperor had hoped for 
his success in suppressing 'all barbarian [meaning pagan] peoples'.30 In the late Middle Ages 
the liturgies for both the German (Aachen) and Roman coronations for the Empire's ruler 
continued to emphasize his duty to extend by successful war the frontiers of the Christian 
community.31 The habitual formulations of the imperial chancery, faithful to the teachings of 
Latin theology and canon law, went on portraying the German monarch as a wielder of the 
gladius saecularis – a universal coercive power which, it was argued, complemented the 
'spiritual sword' entrusted to the priesthood.32 
The tradition which made the German people alone rightful custodians of the 
Christian Roman Empire was of less ancient origin. But by the second half of the thirteenth 
century it too had put down substantial roots in European constitutional thought. The 
conflicts of principle between the papacy and the Hohenstaufen, which came to a head in the 
first half of the century, had stimulated a closer scrutiny of the Empire's history and of the 
entitlements of its bearers. Innocent III's decretal Venerabilem, issued in 1202, became a 
foundation for future discussions, with its clear ruling that the papacy had, in the time of 
Charlemagne, transferred to the Germans the right to nominate candidates for the imperial 
throne.33 Admittedly, not everyone agreed either that the pope had been the author of the 
Empire's translation or that it was under Charlemagne that imperial power had passed to the 
Germans.34 Nevertheless, Venerabilem did focus attention on one crucial question: why 
specifically the Germans? Innocent himself had not directly answered it, but others soon did 
– such as the German canonist Johannes Teutonicus, who insisted that all acknowledge 'that 
the Teutons by their virtues have won the Empire'.35 
The debate took on a new urgency after 1250, however. The Hohenstaufen dynasty's 
hold on the imperial crown had been broken; within a few years the German prince-electors 
had placed on the throne an English and a Castilian prince; and the king of Bohemia too was 
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more than once a candidate for the Empire.36 Most strikingly, the whole association of the 
German people with the imperial title was in these years brought into question. Venerabilem 
itself raised the possibility that what the papacy had given it might take away. Within a 
generation of Frederick II's death proposals were being advanced for a fundamental 
reorganization of the Empire and rumours circulated to the effect that the pope was planning 
to break up its territories.37 But the notion also surfaced that the imperial office itself might 
be translated afresh, to some more fitting bearer.38 A suitable candidate appeared ready at 
hand, in the form of the French people, whose princes were able during the later thirteenth 
century to bask in the reflected glory of that paragon of Christian warrior-kingship, Louis 
IX.39 The strengthening French Carolingian tradition added its own note: had not 
Charlemagne himself been rex Francorum?40 Speculation was heightened by repeated 
diplomatic manoeuvres, in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, to place a French 
prince on the imperial throne.41 It drew nourishment from popular prophecies which awaited 
the coming of a new Charles, from the French royal line.42 French prestige, moreover, had a 
counterpart in the scorn now being expressed in some quarters among the Germans' western 
neighbours for the universalist posturings of a people and of rulers in whose own German 
kingdom, as the Spanish canonist Vincentius put it, 'every hut usurps lordship for itself'.43 
When the Empire's translation was discussed, questions about the relative suitability 
of different peoples – and thus, about 'national character' – were never far from the surface. 
The very idea of translatio imperii – finding an appropriate custodian for an office understood 
principally in terms of protection and coercion – ensured a place for the language of ethnic 
stereotype at the heart of learned political speculation. Such language became a natural 
recourse for the group of mainly German theorists and pamphleteers who in the two centuries 
after 1250 set out to show the rightness of their own people's continuing tie with the 
Empire.44 To establish the claims of the Germans to the Christian Roman heritage, they 
adopted two interwoven strategies: unfolding the long and illustrious history of warfare 
waged by 'German' monarchs on behalf of the Church; and grounding the Empire's history 
and fate in an interpretation of German identity. 
Their characteristic viewpoint, which compressed German into Frankish history, was 
capable of endowing the Empire's bearers with an impressive military pedigree – one which, 
unparalleled in the world, stretched unbroken from Charles Martel to the emperors of the 
central Middle Ages, as the fourteenth-century publicist Lupold of Bebenburg explained.45 
The kings and emperors of the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries were shown leading 
triumphant armies over the Alps, to free the church of Rome from the Lombards.46 Late 
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medieval writers were able to cast over the raiding, plundering, and tribute-taking of the 
Carolingians and Ottonians the self-same legitimizing mantle that Frankish and Saxon 
churchmen had once applied, of warfare and protection in the name of the Church.47 
Alexander of Roes noted with satisfaction that Charlemagne had brought the Saxons into the 
Christian fold 'rather by the material than by the spiritual sword'.48 Lupold of Bebenburg 
recounted how Henry I had taught the Northmen and the Danes, by force of arms, to bear the 
yoke of Christ, and how Otto II, his grandson, had so triumphed over the Slavs that they 
willingly became both Christians and tributaries.49 To recount German history was to unfold 
a story of sacred violence. Under the Hohenstaufen, the imperial mission of warfare for the 
Faith had crystallized in the belief that it was the emperor's duty to lead the crusade against 
the heathen.50 This idea too proved long-lived. Dietrich of Niem, writing early in the fifteenth 
century, blamed the defeat of the multi-national crusading army at Nicopolis in 1396 on 
French usurpation of the place in the van that by tradition belonged to the Germans 'in all 
wars against the Saracens'.51 
 It was not without reason, the argument went, that the Germans had for so long been 
the Church's strong arm. Dietrich's remark highlights a recurrent principle in German writings 
on the Empire: that the Germans, alone among Europe's peoples, possessed the qualities 
which imperial rule demanded. These were, necessarily, qualities which were associated with 
the ancient Romans, whose direct political heirs the Germans claimed to be. For medieval 
people, the Romans were above all great soldiers and conquerors. German writers were 
understandably at pains to trace links between their forebears and a Roman past: through 
Caesar's conquests and foundations, and his settlement of Romans in Germany;52 through the 
Roman ancestry traced by some German dynasties;53 and through the aid which, in a popular 
and much-repeated tradition, the ancient Germans had given Caesar in wresting supreme 
power from the senate.54 By assimilating the Germans to the Franks – whose Trojan origins 
were a long-established tradition – it became possible to claim a direct blood tie between 
Romans and Germans, and thus to portray the latter more credibly as the heirs to Roman 
characteristics.55 Alexander of Roes maintained that the Roman blood of the Germans was 
evident from their seriousness (which distinguished them from the frivolous French), and 
from their devotion to war and conflict.56 The moral was clear: barbarian peoples, Alexander 
observed, flee before the eagles of the Romans and the Germans, whereas they have no fear 
of the lily of France.57 
 
III 
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 What really concerned German writers was the supreme fitness for armed struggle that their 
people's links with Rome affirmed. Here, it seemed, lay their fundamental title to the Empire. 
Conrad of Megenberg, in a dialogue between a personified Ecclesia and the pope, has the 
Church explain how, if the Germans were to lose the Empire, both she and the papacy would 
be defenceless against tyrants.58 Alexander of Roes expressed succinctly what appears to 
have been a widely held view when he described the entire German people as showing the 
qualities of a warrior nobility: collectively they constituted the militia of Latin Christendom, 
hence their indispensability to its defence.59 His perception did not lack a certain objective 
basis: nobles and their values really did permeate to a striking degree the political life and 
culture of later medieval Germany. The hold exercised by local aristocratic families over 
German episcopal churches, and the consequent bellicosity of many of their incumbents, 
were proverbial.60 In many German towns, ruling elites assimilated themselves to the martial 
culture and lifestyle of the landed nobility.61 Seen from this perspective, the infusion of 
aristocratic priorities and standards of judgement into the imperial idea too becomes readily 
comprehensible. 
'Verliuset Diutschiu zunge ir reht, daz wirt sie an eren swachen': should the Germans 
('the German tongue') lose their imperial title, it will undermine their honour. The words are 
from a verse composed soon after the middle of the thirteenth century by a singer known as 
'Meißner'.62 If the Germans were, as Alexander claimed, Christendom's militia, that fact was 
attested by the singular honour that they had won, namely the Empire, which served as their 
collective patent of nobility. It was not only learned publicists who thought this way. Timothy 
Reuter has shown how profoundly imperial politics in twelfth-century Germany was founded 
upon notions of honour and status.63 In the following period, as the association between the 
Empire and the German people became more explicit, the same modes of thought came to 
infuse German identity itself. What marked the Germans out in their own estimation was 
something more personal than just success in war: it was the qualities of the soldier, a special 
relationship with the heroic. The Germans were exemplars of strenuitas, animositas, 
audacia.64 And to a talent for fighting was joined a taste for it – 'joy in battle', in one 
chronicler's phrase.65 In vernacular form, their qualities gained an epic ring: a successful or 
admired ruler, like Rudolf of Habsburg or Henry VII, was for the poets a helt ('hero'), or a 
degen ('mighty warrior').66 The chronicler Mathias of Neuenburg has Rudolf boast, after his 
victory at Besançon in 1289, that with just four German knights and forty footsoldiers he 
could overcome any multitude.67 Privileged status, it was clear, required constant 
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justification: honour had to be vindicated, and blemishes made good. The German princes – 
according to Venerabilem, the real beneficiaries of the Empire's translation – had a special 
responsibility for performing, in company with the ruler, those feats of arms upon which their 
people's standing depended. 
At a time when imperial power was weak, and the German title to the Empire in some 
doubt, a heavy burden of obligation was thus naturally laid at the princes' door. German 
commentators addressed the problem of imperial renovatio in a language of honour, loyalty, 
and valour, and of their antitheses: cowardice, treachery, and shame. In an address, in 
German verse, to the princes met at Passau in 1348, the poet Lupold Hornburg portrayed the 
Empire, in the guise of a beautiful woman, as denuded of her dignity. Her rulers had set aside 
the heroism of their forebears, and now had time only for lies, deception, and the toadying of 
the court. The Reich was in the hands of 'cowards', soft men who, Lupold lamented, 'do not 
thirst after honour'. Consequently, Germany herself 'stands in small regard'.68 The remedy 
was plain: emperors and princes should rediscover the hard, martial habits of yore.69 Lupold's 
diagnosis must appear somewhat surprising, in an age when some observers were identifying 
the Germans' immoderate taste for sturmen and striten as a major cause of the Empire's 
enfeeblement.70 Yet it reflects a mode of thought whose naturalness for many literate 
Germans is attested by references in similar vein in the chronicles. The Strasbourg chronicler 
Gottfried of Ensmingen records how 'the good name of the knighthood of the German realm' 
was tarnished by the flight of a German nobleman in battle.71 Crucially, the opposing force 
had included French-speakers. All was ultimately well, however, when in 1289 King Rudolf 
led his German forces in a triumphant campaign into the French-speaking south-west, 'in 
order to recover the honour and the good name of all of Germany'.72 It was war that had 
provided the German militia with their imperial charter, and through war alone, waged in the 
Empire's name, could they reaffirm it in time of need. 
 
IV 
 
If medieval Germans habitually sought warlike qualities in their rulers, elements in the 
political life of the later Middle Ages conspired to ensure that such qualities came particularly 
to the fore. The elective imperial crown, firmly established in the second half of the thirteenth 
century, had its theoretical justification in the principle of idoneity – that the most suitable 
candidate should be chosen.73 The needs of contemporary rulership no less than customary 
expectation ensured that the ruler's military capacities got prominent mention in the formal 
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declarations of his personal qualities which the election procedure involved. In 1273 the 
electors made known that the new king, Rudolf of Habsburg, was 'vigorous in body, and 
blessed with success in warfare against the wicked'.74 Such judgements were not confined to 
official pronouncements. The Swabian continuator of the Kaiserchronik observed that the 
princes chose the count of Habsburg because, although not of Hohenstaufen blood ('von 
Stoufen niht geborn'), he was – note once more the heroic strain – a man outstanding in 
valour: 'an manhait uzerkorn'.75 
 The problems which German monarchs faced in establishing and maintaining 
themselves on the throne seemed to call for the qualities of a warrior hero. If the Empire's 
rulers could not raise great armies against their neighbours, they were often forced to 
assemble smaller ones against their own subjects and rivals. The century after 1250 was 
marked by split elections, by periodic spats with Roman and Avignon popes, and by 
challenges from powerful imperial vassals.76 The crises of royal power and legitimacy that 
resulted were frequently resolved by armed force. The grinding military commitment that 
awaited a new king of uncertain title is illuminated by Count William of Holland, elected 
with papal backing against the Staufer in 1248, who in the period to 1251 alone conducted 
thirteen separate sieges.77 Merely reaching Charlemagne's minster at Aachen for coronation 
necessitated a six-month siege of the town, before William's army, reinforced by papal 
crusaders, could force an entry. The fates of the rulers themselves reflect the tenor of the 
time, with around half of the kings and emperors of the period meeting deaths linked to 
violence – on the battlefield, on campaign, or under the assassin's blade.78 Pitched battle 
several times settled a seemingly intractable constitutional question.79  
 The task of governing the Empire's German territories was understood as an 
essentially military one, a view actually encouraged by the meagreness of the monarch's 
resources and the scale of the challenges facing him. The disordered state of the German 
lands is a recurrent lament of the chroniclers and, if their sentiments are at all representative 
of their fellow-countrymen, it is clear that establishing peace by suppressing local disorder 
and violent crime was the most urgent demand set before a ruler.80 A hint of what was hoped 
for and required is provided by the Austrian chronicler Jansen Enikel, writing in the 
vernacular for an urban, burgher audience, in his account of Caesar's exemplary rulership: 
'The lord Julius / Thus made good peace / In all the German lands, / Because wherever his 
power was recognized, / There he was greatly feared'.81 Enikel ends with the characteristic 
reflection that Caesar's warlike deeds won him 'great honour'. 
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The use of conspicuous military display to articulate and validate political authority 
was a well-established – in the eyes of some a distinctive – part of German political life, and 
the limited resources and urgent duties of rulership in the two centuries after 1250 helped to 
ensure its perpetuation.82 Shows of armed force gained greater ideological significance, 
however, and a far more explicit association with notions of Germanness, when the ruler 
attempted to exercise power south of the Alps. There, German arms not only enforced but 
actually embodied imperial authority: a concession granted by Rudolf of Habsburg's vicar in 
Tuscany relieved the Sienese of any obligation of fealty to the Empire until they should be 
visited either by the monarch himself or by a force of at least five hundred German knights.83 
But for well-informed Germans the expeditions that their ruler led over the Alps in person 
had a special significance. In the century after Frederick II's death these became both less 
numerous and, when they did occur, distinctly more modest in scale, duration, and 
achievements than in times past.84 Yet literate Germans of the fourteenth century show a 
telling determination to paint the short-lived and ill-starred ventures of Henry VII (1308-
1313) and Ludwig the Bavarian (1314-1347) in the south in colours of militant triumph. 
 What the chroniclers had in mind remains visible in a coloured drawing in the Codex 
Balduini Trevirensis, made in the circle of Baldwin of Luxemburg, archbishop of Trier 
(1307-1354). Henry VII, Baldwin's brother, is seen heading south over a stylised alpine ridge 
under a forest of lances and imperial banners, amid a dense press of helmeted and mailshirted 
men, the electors  among them.85 Crossing the Alps in military array was no mere act of rule, 
but part of the necessary and accustomed spectacle of Empire: chroniclers understood this, 
and took care to see what tradition taught them they must.86 What is more, the journey south 
had by the fourteenth century come to manifest, like few other tasks of government, the 
special relationship of the German people with imperial majesty. During preparations for an 
aborted Italian expedition under Rudolf of Habsburg the bishop of Basel wrote to the king 
from Rome, urging him to assemble 'a band of warriors such as mighty Germania can 
nurture'.87 He took pains to impress on Rudolf the need for a truly magnificent show of force, 
'thereby gaining infinite glory for Germany and renown that will endure for many 
generations'. 
 Triumphant show needed to be followed by triumphant deeds. Here too, writers were 
moved to adopt a language of extravagant military success inherited from a more glorious 
German imperial past.88 The inconclusive street-fighting in which Henry VII became 
embroiled when he reached Rome in 1312 was transformed by the chroniclers into a 
sanguinary vindication of German animositas: men waded up to their knees in blood and the 
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Tiber itself flowed red.89 Otto of Freising's celebrated quip, that Barbarossa's army paid the 
Romans for the imperial crown not in Arabian gold but Teutonic iron, is paralleled by 
similarly grim epigrams fathered on Henry VII.90 These – indeed the whole language of 
German military action in the south – illuminate a point of the greatest importance: that 
images of German bellicosity only gained their full meaning when placed within larger 
networks of ethnic stereotypes. 
The rhetoric of German triumph relied upon a parallel rhetoric, of subjection, 
humiliation, and expropriation.91 Whether in the writings of publicists and pamphleteers, the 
narratives of Latin and vernacular chroniclers, or the verses of poets and singers, we find the 
self-same amalgam of tendentious, counterposed, and mutually-supporting stereotypes. Just 
as the Germans were natural conquerors and rulers, so Italians were by nature subjects. For 
Alexander of Roes they were the populus to Germany's militia.92 The German people, says 
the Königsaal chronicler 'was accustomed always to be victorious, and was therefore very 
ready manfully to assail and put to flight the soft and feminine spirit of the Gauls' – meaning 
here Italians.93 Not only the people, but their lands too were soft and feminine, rich and ripe 
for exploitation, and thus naturally subject and tributary – hence the repeated reference in 
German sources of various kinds to the Empire's Italian territories as its 'garden', its 'pleasure 
garden', or its 'orchard'.94 
 To find stereotypes deployed in this way can occasion little surprise. Is this not 
precisely the language of domination and control, over a constructed, subordinate 'other', that 
we have learned to expect self-styled 'imperial' peoples in any age to speak?95 Support for 
such a reading of the German evidence seems to come from a viewpoint which has in recent 
times found favour among medievalists. In a number of influential studies, the period 
between roughly the twelfth and fourteenth centuries has been ascribed a special significance, 
as a time when European powers and elites began to assert harsher and more exclusive kinds 
of dominance, supported by a new vocabulary of belonging and exclusion.96 Cultural 
developments took a fundamental place within a larger pattern of strengthening hegemonies. 
If boundaries of various sorts came in this period to be more assiduously policed, that was 
partly because they had been rendered more visible, and capable of more articulate 
delineation, by a new battery of terms and concepts, derived in part from the revived study of 
Antiquity.97 Political relationships were naturally among those affected: literary models of 
'binary difference', often drawing upon classical distinctions between civilization and 
barbarism, were applied to lend dominion and expropriation the stamp of the inevitable, the 
natural, the God-given.98 There may have been only one Roman Empire in western Europe, 
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but there were plenty of would-be empire-builders, and an inherited and rejuvenated 
repertoire of stereotypes, the argument goes, furnished some formidable construction 
materials.99 
 
V 
 
The language of German imperialism, with its stress on military triumph over a naturally 
servile 'other', seems to suit such a picture precisely. Yet it is necessary only to recall the state 
of imperial rulership, both north and south of the Alps, in the decades after 1250 for it to 
become clear that the relationship between power and stereotyping must necessarily have 
been somewhat different in the German case. When German writers invoked images of heroic 
warriorship and its antitheses their characteristic object was not to legitimize recent conquest 
or sustain novel claims to rule, but to affirm what they regarded as a time-honoured political 
order – 'the pre-eminence of the Roman Empire', as Alexander of Roes put it – and to defend 
and celebrate the special status of its status-conscious German custodians.100 Such intentions 
are far removed from the confident, aggressively intolerant, 'state-building' climate in which 
some historians locate the proliferation of stereotypes. The vocabulary of identity and 
'otherness', in German mouths of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, was an avowedly 
conservative one, uttered in a mood of crisis, against times which, especially for the Empire’s 
better-informed and more widely travelled champions, seemed filled with dangerous 
novelties. Most alarming of these was the challenge posed by that upstart rival militia whose 
shadow loomed beyond the western frontier: the kingdom of France, its people, and its 'most 
Christian' kings.101 
 German writers were accustomed to describe their Romance-speaking neighbours, 
whether south of the Alps or west of the Meuse, in strikingly similar ways. Even much of the 
terminology was common: Italians or French, all were Walhen in the vernacular and, on 
occasion at least, Gallici in Latin.102 The character traits supposedly distinctive to the two 
peoples were also to some degree common, serving to locate both in the self-same subjection 
to the Germans. The French, no less than the Italians, emerge from German writings as an 
effeminate people, calling for tutelage and a firm hand.103 It was an imputation that suited 
perfectly the objectives of German treatise-writers, keen to banish the spectre of an 
impending translatio imperii in Francos. Conrad of Megenberg's Ecclesia thus urged the pope 
not to charge the Empire's shield with the lilies of France, 'which are soft and womanish'.104  
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It thus comes as no surprise to encounter the French, in German writings, repeatedly 
failing the key test of fitness for imperial rule: trial by battle. Like the Italians, they are 
dismissed as hopelessly ineffective soldiers. The claim was no mere utilitarian confection of 
the publicists, who here invoked more deep-rooted German attitudes; 105 but it was an idea 
that imperialist treatise-writers were particularly assiduous in exploiting. In his Noticia seculi 
of 1288, written soon after the troubled end of Charles of Anjou's reign, Alexander of Roes 
had a moral to point. Their recent military setbacks, he explained, were but a foretaste of the 
chastisement that awaited the French, should they continue to claim a role for which they 
were manifestly not fitted: nature had allocated them pacific functions within the Christian 
commonwealth, as scholars and clerks; yet 'they strive, like Teutons and warriors, to be cruel 
and bellicose men and plunderers'.106 The French presumption which Dietrich of Niem 
thought had betrayed the Christian cause at Nicopolis was, from a German point of view, no 
isolated lapse, but one further instance of a familiar habit, of usurping positions of command 
which rightly belonged to their eastern neighbour. To the faint-heartedness characteristic of 
Walhen generally, the French – who affected a fashionable chivalric swagger and stretched 
out their hand for the imperial crown itself – added evil and dangerous traits of their own: 
self-deluding vanity and the grave sin of pride.107 
In Alexander's view, not only were the French less manly, and thus less warlike, than 
the Germans; they were also their juniors – a kindred but later offshoot of the Frankish 
family.108 The position which he ascribed them as Christendom’s natural clerks (clerus) 
similarly de-sexed and disarmed them, and placed them under the protection of the Empire’s 
German militia.109 His reflections on the subject of German and French 'national character' 
illustrate powerfully how ethnic stereotypes, far from being mere thoughtless tags of abuse or 
self-flattery, could take a central place within deliberate and ambitious arguments. Alexander 
knew well how to set stereotypes to work for him – not only to laud his fellow-Germans but 
also, no less importantly, to display their Italian subjects in fitting attitudes of subjection and 
to name and shame their most menacing rivals. Listing and classifying within hierarchical 
schemes was a habit congenial to educated medieval minds.110 It was no mere intellectual 
game, however: when Alexander shuffled stereotypes to support his view of the right order in 
human affairs, he did so in response to other contemporary schemes of stereotyping, which 
were arguing for a quite different order. It is the outstanding qualities of the French, he 
admits, that prompt some to see them as candidates for the Empire.111 The Germans, by 
contrast, are condemned by their critics as rude and uncultivated: how, such persons ask, can 
they govern the whole of Christendom, when even their own dress and manners are so 
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disorderly?112 Alexander believed he could rebut such frivolous objections. Yet the terms in 
which he was led to defend his fellow-countrymen, and the concessions which he felt 
compelled to make to their critics, prompt as many questions as they answer. 
 
VI 
 
The Germans too, Alexander conceded, had their faults: not only the coarseness of which 
their French rivals indicted them, but also cruelty, rapacity,  and an innate love of quarrels.113 
It is hard to see how Alexander's medieval readers could wholly have escaped the reflection, 
obvious to modern ones, that a people marked by such vices was perhaps not so incontestably 
fitted for the guardianship of Christendom after all. The light which his words casts upon the 
more troubling dimensions of German bellicosity encourages closer scrutiny of some of the 
celebrations of German valour found in other writings. It is easy to understand why, for 
example, the Königsaal chronicler gave prominence to Henry VII's martial entry into Rome; 
but what is to be made of his picture of the emperor's German forces cutting a swathe through 
the city's Italian defenders 'like ravening wolves among defenceless sheep'?114 In fact, 
although German writers mostly deployed references to their people's bellicosity in what they 
intended as positive ways, the actual characteristics which they invoked were by no means 
self-evidently flattering, but rather, at best, troublingly ambiguous. 
Under the year 1336 the chronicler John of Winterthur notes that the king of Hungary 
had broken off a military campaign because, on one report, he dreaded the advent of the 
Germans (especially the Swabians, adds John), 'and fled as if before a whirlwind or a raging 
tempest (tempestatem furiosam)'.115 On this if on little else the Germans and their southern 
and western neighbours were of one mind: the Teutons were a furious people.116 But was 
resembling a raging tempest a reputation to cherish, or one to live down? Does German furor 
belong in the category of 'positive' or of 'negative' stereotypes – or does it in fact permit any 
such absolute view?117 Its use by German writers was certainly in most cases clearly 
laudatory.118 Viewed from the south, however, the picture was very different. Petrarch 
summed up what he judged to be the essence of Italian superiority over the northern 
neighbour in a stark antithesis: vertù contra furore.119 If furor Teutonicus was a familiar 
rhetorical cliché, it was nevertheless one with potentially complex significance: in German 
writings a proud boast, affirming ancient titles to power; in Italian ones a bitter, shaming 
reproach hurled at the wild men beyond the mountains. Yet the picture is in fact more 
complex still: the furious ways of the Teutons, it soon becomes clear, gave northerners too 
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occasional cause to reflect.120 A purely functional interpretation of the theme of German fury 
will not therefore suffice, since its meaning, and thus its purpose, varied sharply in line with 
different authorial standpoints, traditions, and objectives.121 What is needed instead is an 
approach capable of illuminating something of the range of images and associations which 
the motif invoked. For this, it is necessary to follow furor Teutonicus back to its origins. 
The phrase was a coinage of the Roman poet Lucan, recounting the incursions which 
Germanic tribes – the Cimbri and the Teutones – had made into the Empire at the end of the 
second century BC.122 It entered medieval writings during the Investiture Contest, by which 
time Lucan's ancient Teutones had become contemporary Teutons, and it gained acceptance 
on both sides of the Alps in the course of imperial campaigns in Italy in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries. The idea of behaviour inspired by innate 'fury' calls for some scrutiny, 
since it had deep roots in medieval literate culture, and tended naturally to invoke a range of 
further, kindred motifs. A furious people might indeed, in the medieval view, gain a name for 
martial prowess and conquest: for Oderic Vitalis, writing in the twelfth century, furor 
distinguished the Normans.123 It was nonetheless a rather different quality from fortitude: a 
man fleeing a battlefield in blind panic could be termed a furibundus.124 At its heart lay 
surrender to some overmastering passion. For Roman writers like Lucan, furor was a defining 
feature of the 'other' beyond the frontier: Romans may have been outstanding warriors, but in 
Antique thought barbarians alone were furious ones.125 Classical conceptions of barbarism 
struck early and lasting roots in medieval Europe’s scholarly tradition, gaining a fresh 
prominence in the intellectual currents of the central Middle Ages.126 Albertus Magnus, who 
wrote in Germany during the troubled thirteenth century, observed that the barbarian, unlike 
the civilized man, 'is moved … by unreasoning fury, lust, and self-delusion'.127 Fury, to the 
educated medieval mind, inescapably called forth a cluster of alarming cognate qualities, 
associated with the Antique image of the barbarian: manners untutored by reason; backward 
and disorderly political arrangements; and a cruel, ill-disciplined, and predatory style of war. 
It is necessary only to recall Alexander’s damning claim, that the French aspired to 
equal the Germans in cruelty and plundering, for it to become evident that Teutonic martial 
virtues were, for educated Germans scarcely less than for hostile outsiders, inseparable from 
some plainly barbarian shortcomings. Others confirmed Alexander’s view that Germans 
made harsh soldiers.128 To cruelty, moreover, was joined, in German portrayals of their 
compatriots at war, a rashness in battle and a characteristically heedless rush for booty that on 
occasion proved militarily counterproductive.129 For Italian commentators, many 
characteristic evils of the northern way of fighting – cruelty, greed, injustice – were 
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condensed into the deeds of German mercenary bands in the south in the fourteenth 
century.130 For some Germans too, the condottieri had a part (though a far smaller one than 
for Italians) in shaping a dark vision of their people in arms: Conrad of Megenberg reflected 
that Germans who joined professional companies fought unjust wars, since it was their arms 
that kept in power the tyrants of Lombardy.131 For Isidore of Seville, it might here be noted, 
what drove men to wage unjust wars was furor.132 
 
VII 
 
It was not only on the battlefield that barbarian motifs crowded in upon the Germans. In the 
accounts of some of their southern and western neighbours, the unreasoning fury of the 
Teutons was portrayed as robbing them of their very humanity, hence the range of 'bestial' 
qualities with which Italian and French writers were inclined to surround them: an alleged 
aversion to washing, disgusting table manners, want of dress sense, habitual drunkenness;133 
and the German language itself, compared on occasion with the roaring of lions or with a 
terrible thunder, but also with the barking of dogs, the howling of wolves, and the croaking of 
frogs.134 If in German eyes the Empire's Italian 'garden' represented nature tamed and 
harnessed, Italian viewpoints portrayed Germany as nature run wild, raging, unbounded, and 
uncultivated. Petrarch wrote of the clouds from the north shedding an 'iron rain' of criminal 
soldiery on his native land.135 
The fully developed picture of the German barbarian was unfolded in French and 
Italian writings, and it is to these that it is necessary to turn to observe most clearly the 
interconnection of the image's various component themes. German views were naturally 
more muted. Yet the unflattering perspectives which Romance-speakers laid out were no 
calumnies of their own recent fabrication, but elements drawn and re-fashioned from a 
literate culture in which all educated Europeans had a share. For Germans too they were 
inescapable – particularly for those Germans who went in search of a literary pedigree for the 
claims of Teutonic arms. Consequently, some of the same motifs for the German lands and 
their inhabitants – motifs stressing the raw, the outsized, and the immoderate – are 
encountered in German writings also. Sometimes they were given what appears to be a 
positive colouring. More than one German writer spoke warmly of the immense stature and 
sturdy physique of his fellow-countrymen.136 The view that Teutons were robusti was one 
which enjoyed general agreement, and which in the later Middle Ages was reinforced by an 
origin myth tracing their descent from a giant.137 But neither could Germans choose to 
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overlook those troublesome barbarian failings – dull-wittedness, gluttony, drunkenness, 
inurbanitas, as well as a taste for blood – with which their neighbours charged them. Some 
Germans had experienced French and Italian scorn at first hand. The humanists were not the 
first generation of educated northerners whose self-consciousness was moulded by travel: 
Alexander of Roes, Conrad of Megenberg, and Dietrich of Niem are among those who spent 
lengthy periods at the papal Curia at Rome and Avignon. Each of them recounts in some 
detail, from evident personal acquaintance, the faults which in their time others were laying at 
their people's door.138 
Just as important, however, was the influence exerted by literary tradition. The 
chronicles of the early Middle Ages, and the regional historical memories which they 
nourished, kept before the eyes of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Germans an image, if 
not quite of the vices, then at least of the elemental, untutored ferocity of their forebears. The 
vernacular Schöppenchronik, begun in official circles in fourteenth-century Magdeburg, 
depicts the ancient Franks warning their king against an alliance with the Saxons, who were 
'a wild, untamed people'.139 The etymologies of tribal names preserved comparable ideas in 
easily-memorable form. Lupold of Bebenburg was just one of those to repeat the well-worn 
commonplace that the Franks were so-called because they were 'fierce'.140 By land and sea 
alike the Saxons were 'intractable and rock-hard', according to the Franciscan encyclopedist 
Bartholomaeus Anglicus, who taught at Magdeburg in the thirteenth century.141 
The literary inheritance of Latin Antiquity, however, shaped in particularly deep and 
compelling ways the late medieval image of the German. The belief sometimes encountered, 
that the rediscovery of Tacitus first introduced literate Germans to classical thought about 
their character and ancestry, is far from the truth – though it did, unquestionably, enrich their 
view of Germanic prehistory.142 Although the Germania and the Annales had fallen into 
obscurity in medieval Europe, other Antique works reflecting Roman views of the barbarian 
continued to be read.143 The chronicler John of Viktring, for example, was able to draw on 
writings by Josephus, Vegetius, and Isidore for his observations on the inhospitable German 
climate and the ferocity, huge size, and physical strength of the natives.144 Isidore alone (who 
had emphasized the rapacity of the gentes Germaniae as well as their fortitude) bequeathed to 
later centuries an eloquent and widely-invoked conspectus of barbarian qualities.145 However 
much German writers sought to concentrate on the seemingly more laudable elements in their 
people's inherited image, its alarming resonances in ancient thought could never be wholly 
suppressed.146 
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VIII 
 
If the ethnic topoi handed down to literate Germans of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries 
were there to be used, they had also somehow to be coped with. The vocabulary of ideas and 
concepts which they yielded facilitated, and supplied a structure for, those arguments, claims, 
and controversies which in the decades after Frederick II's death helped to constitute a 
deepened sense of Germanness. Yet while Germans had considerable scope to manipulate 
their inherited stock of autostereotypes, they could not simply abolish it, nor could they easily 
add to it or ignore its individual elements. The authority of the past set its own agenda, and 
German writers were in some measure the servants, as well as the architects, of the ideas 
upon which their people's identity rested. One way of coping was to confront directly some of 
the more disturbing components of the classical tradition, and apply them to the analysis of 
contemporary German society. Given the intimate links between warfare and government in 
German thinking, the more blameworthy elements in the German style of war which some 
writers conceded could scarcely have failed to have political repercussions. Was it any 
coincidence, some asked, that German public life appeared so bloody and chaotic?147 The 
rapacity identified by Alexander of Roes was just one German failing that could not easily be 
confined to the battlefield. Lupold of Bebenburg is among those who pilloried the German 
princes as thieves and raptores, whose short-sighted selfishness was endangering German 
possession of the Empire itself.148 The problem was not merely the ambition or self-interest 
of the leaders of German society but, as stereotype seemed to show, their reckless 
impulsiveness, which drove the Germans not only to plunder others, but also themselves. 
Alexander of Roes, as so often, sums up the view of literate Germans of his age in his 
plaintive wish that his fellow-countrymen might learn foresight.149 
It was Conrad of Megenberg, however, who took the further step of relating the 
lessons of Antique ethnology directly to the problems of governing fourteenth-century 
Germany. One powerful source of conflicts, he admitted, was the elective crown. But matters 
were not helped by 'the fury (furor) and impatience of the German people, through which 
quarrels are sown among them daily'.150 Conrad offered an analysis of the German 
temperament which borrowed ideas from Aristotle, and reflected theories about the northern 
barbarian widely held in the learned world of the ancient Mediterranean.151 The Germans, he 
explained, live far from the sun, and the speed and quantity of their blood, from which they 
have their boldness, account also for their rashness.152 The evil proclivities to which birth and 
environment gave rise were, Conrad believed, aggravated by social attitudes commonly 
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encountered among Germans. His fellow-countrymen, he lamented, dismissed learned 
knights as 'book-eaters' and, training up their own young in physical arms alone, sent them 
off to war unarmed with the prudence that overcomes mere brute strength.153 Here was 
another lesson with relevance beyond the battlefield, in an age in which reason, honed by 
book learning, was coming to seem an essential foundation not only for military success but 
for the exercise of all public power and authority.154 
Applying the language of ethnic stereotype so explicitly to the ills of contemporary 
German society was a high-risk strategy, however – one which was always prone to highlight 
the seeming incongruity of a people so infused with barbarian traits sporting the mantle of 
imperial Rome.155 Qualities which, in the formulations of ancient writers, were synonymous 
with a fundamental incapacity for orderly political life sat uncomfortably beside German 
claims to universal power. At a time when good government was widely held to be founded 
on reason, unreasoning wildness inevitably looked to some less like a charter for rule than a 
disqualification.156 Exactly those qualities which some Germans perceived in their own 
political life – fragmentation, discontinuity, violence, cruelty, irregularity – were ones which 
elsewhere in Europe were being cited as arguments for the fundamental unfitness of certain 
peoples to manage their own affairs, and thus for their rightful subjection to other, more 
advanced, powers.157 Indeed, Germans themselves invoked on occasion a very similar 
repertoire of negative attributes in order to portray as backward – and thus, in some instances 
at least, to claim authority over – the peoples beyond their own eastern and north-eastern 
frontiers: Bohemians, Poles, Hungarians, Scandinavians, and Baltic pagans.158 
The treatise-writers of the later Middle Ages – the most articulate and self-conscious 
scrutineers of the German character – were therefore on the whole loathe to ponder too 
deeply the constitutional implications of those failings which tradition laid at their people's 
door. Instead, they tended to concentrate on deliberately minimizing the significance of the 
more troubling aspects of the ancient image of the German, or on re-casting as strengths their 
people's alleged shortcomings, and arguing that the truly harmful political vices were those of 
their over-civilized neighbours and rivals.159 The arguments of the publicists adopted a series 
of polarities, which aimed to make the best of their people's inherited barbarian image – 
pitting the battlefield against the court, the open-hearted soldier against the deceitful flatterer, 
and hard deeds against vain words. The German is indeed a glutton, agrees Conrad of 
Megenberg's Ecclesia, 'but in war he hurries as if in courtly service'.160 Dietrich of Niem was 
another writer who conceded charges of German coarseness and hard drinking, only to 
contrast approvingly the honest simplicity of past emperors with the worldly vanities of the 
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schismatic Curia.161 By equating courtliness with corruption, servility, and cowardice, 
German writers were able to present the boorishness which both literary tradition and 
contemporary critics found in their own people as at worst a venial shortcoming, if not actual 
evidence of underlying virtue. 
The view which contrasted wholesome Germanic severity with the soft and 
degenerate ways of the south and west was therefore no invention of the humanists, but one 
which gained wide currency among literate Germans in course of the crises and debates of 
the later Middle Ages. Indeed, Germans of the Lutherzeit were to forge their own arguments 
in substantial part out of the rich chronicle and publicist literature that flowed from German 
pens between the mid-thirteenth and mid-fifteenth centuries.162 At the heart of this lay a view 
of the German warrior, of his plain, homely merits, and of the high rewards which these had 
earned his people. Yet the closing centuries of the Middle Ages had taught the Empire's 
German supporters some troubling lessons, which their writings could not wholly obscure: 
that in a treacherous world virtue does not invariably have its reward, and that the guileless 
Teutonic hero could not in fact be counted on always to conquer. Mathias of Neuenburg 
recounts a cautionary tale from the battle of Crécy, where – in a striking parallel to Dietrich 
of Niem's account of Nicopolis – the defeated French had first seized the van, in arrogant 
disregard of their German and Bohemian allies, only to flee the field, abandoning the 
Germans, who stood firm, to be slaughtered.163 It was left to the victorious Edward III – who 
as a warrior-king could speak with authority in the matter – to lament the fallen Germans, and 
to reflect how much better he would have rewarded them than had the treacherous French. 
Here was without question a morality story for patriotic Germans; but was its message on the 
whole a reassuring or a disheartening one? As Conrad of Megenberg – writing not long after 
the events of 1346 – had pointed out, unless joined with cunning, German prowess offered 
scant hope of triumph. Barbarian warrior virtues, no less than turbulent barbarian vices, were 
coming to seem increasingly anachronistic in a world in which arms-bearing had long ago 
ceased to be equated with ruling – a world in which, indeed, the universal soldier would soon 
take up his place not among the masters, but the servants.164 
 
IX 
 
New Romans or irredeemable barbarians, lords of the world or hired butchers? If there was 
one thing that the late medieval image of the Germans at war evidently did not do it was 
provide the kind of easy answers to naïve questions which, it is often maintained, account for 
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the appeal of national stereotypes to dull minds throughout the ages. Medieval clichés about 
the warmongering Teutons, all too predictable and readily explicable in some modern eyes, 
turn out to be anything but. Instead, we seem to be faced with a stereotype that will not obey 
the rules, and that turns on its head much conventional wisdom. Its German subjects 
themselves appear as deeply paradoxical figures: a martial race whose laurels from the 
battlefields of late medieval Europe were few and far between; consummate warlords who 
proved notoriously incapable of constructing the kind of institutionalized war machine whose 
assembly in other regions of late medieval Europe is still applauded by some historians as a 
key measure of national achievement. All the signs are that the theme of German belligerence 
was reaching its largest medieval public, attracting unprecedentedly close scrutiny, and 
winning the most wholehearted affirmation from informed commentators, at just the time 
when Germany's political institutions appeared fatally shrunken and debilitated, their 
ideological foundations held up to question as never before. The paradoxes do not end there, 
however. It seems hard to regard either as a mere piece of casual abuse or as a cunningly-
wrought weapon of dominion a stereotype which evidently commanded such substantial 
cross-cultural consensus: whether among the German people's most patriotic champions or its 
sharpest Italian detractors, among devout believers in the universal mission of the late 
medieval Reich or natural sceptics, the view of the Germans as unrivalled exemplars of a kind 
of unadorned military ferocity found wide agreement. The sort of approach which sees 
'national' stereotypes as purpose-made vehicles for the delivery of some single, reassuringly 
straightforward, judgement on a people will not work in this case: if the inherent bellicosity 
of the Germans was a premise enjoying general assent, different writers derived from it 
sharply varying, indeed fundamentally opposed, conclusions. 
 German identity in the Middle Ages was at all times complex. The stresses and strains 
to which German political society was subject in the decades after Frederick II's death 
rendered its complexities more acute and more evident, and exposed them to new, more 
systematic and widespread, kinds of consideration. Some of the starkest tensions and 
contradictions within late medieval notions of Germanness were illuminated by the 
association with war – illuminated but, crucially, not resolved. Where, commentators were 
compelled to ask themselves, did 'Germanness' in its essence lie? And where, we are bound to 
add, lay that 'other' which much current thinking on the subject of identity invites us to 
discern behind every account of collective selfhood? Nowhere settled or straightforward, is 
evidently the answer to both questions. 
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A sense of being German was, in a twofold fashion, defined to an unusual degree 
from the outside. First, it was rendered especially visible through journeys – specifically, 
through journeys over the Alps, and, most characteristically, through the movement of forces 
of armed men.165 It was over the Alps that, at some time in the remote past, were believed to 
have come those migrant bands of soldiers – Trojans, Macedonians, Armenians – who were 
in legend the ancestors of the various German descent groups. Roman armies too had come 
north; and German warbands, it was popularly supposed, had gone south to Caesar's aid. 
Images of German soldiers crossing the Alps at the behest of 'caesar' remained in the late 
Middle Ages a powerful – for some fourteenth-century writers, an indispensable – 
encapsulation of the imperial identity of the Germans. To grasp why that was so, it must be 
noted that the very idea of Germanness – of a political identity common to all the Germanic 
language groups within the medieval Empire – had first taken shape after the Saxon emperors 
began, in the tenth century, to lead armies into Italy.166 The long heritage of armed journeying 
ensured that in a second sense too German identity was historically defined from without: 
through the constructions of 'the German' proposed at various times by those neighbouring 
peoples – particularly Romance-speakers – with whom the northerners had down the 
centuries come into contact. The earliest, tenth- and eleventh-century, references to 'the 
Germans' as a single people, and to their lands, are thus to be found not in German but in 
north Italian and Burgundian writings.167 
Much of the substance of German identity, therefore, lay elsewhere: outside 
'Germany', south of the Alps, embedded within an imperial inheritance attainable only 
through (actual or imagined) travel. And where was its corresponding 'other' to be found? 
Not, alas, safely confined among those neighbouring races within whose supposedly 
unwarlike characteristics some late medieval Germans were at such pains to locate it, but in 
places disturbingly close to home: irremovably rooted within the images of a turbulent, 
barbarian, selfhood from whose shadow late medieval Germans could not hope (and, indeed, 
never wholeheartedly wanted) to escape. 'Barbarian Germany', it might be said, existed in a 
perpetual, troubling, though in certain ways fruitful, dialogue with a parallel and 
interpenetrating 'imperial Germany' – with the fund of memories, traditions, and titles upon 
which were founded the historic claims of the Germans to uniqueness. It was above all in 
reflections about war that the two currents met and merged. 
 The mood of crisis, defensiveness, and perceived decline which often underlies late 
medieval writings touching on questions of German identity, far from straining traditional 
links between the Germans and notions of martial prowess, supplied some urgent impulses 
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for their multiplication and reinforcement.168 It did so in a number of different ways, 
however: the stereotype of the bellicose Teutons proved capable of satisfying simultaneously 
various diverse – indeed, to some extent contradictory – explanatory needs. The view which 
ascribed to the Germans a special relationship with warfare endured, and gathered adherents, 
in the decades after 1250, not because it had one, particular and inescapable, message to 
convey, but because it did not. On the contrary, it was its unsettled (and unsettling), 
ambivalent, and debatable character that explains much of its attractiveness, at a time when 
doubts and questions, more than firm certainties, supplied the core of German identity. There 
are insights here, into the development of political communities, and into the functioning of 
those arguments and discourses from which they are constituted, with applicability beyond 
the German case – and beyond the late Middle Ages. Collective stereotypes, and the ramified 
identities which they focused and energised, amounted to more than mere shadows cast on 
society by the institutions of the nascent 'modern state'. The interactions which they attest, 
between cultural tradition, vital political discourse, and the power of government, were – and 
are – richer, more complex, less predictable, and less linear than has often been supposed. 
Not only confident assertiveness, aggression, and growth, but also a shared sense of 
diminution, and sentiments of nostalgia and disappointment, can be powerful stimuli to 
certain kinds of collective identity. Empires in their heyday may wage wars; but it is part of 
the melancholy lot of fading imperial powers to commemorate and to interpret, to ritualize 
and to mythologize war, and to draw from bygone conflicts lessons – whether comforting, 
disturbing, or both – with which to face an unappealing present and uncertain future. 
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80 A single example, from many which might be cited: Die Chronik Johanns von 
Winterthur, ed. Baethgen, 35, 68, 81. 
 
81 Jansen Enikel, Weltchronik, ed. Strauch, 404. 
 
82 For a celebrated example of the association of the Germans with military display, see 
The Letters of John of Salisbury, ed. W.J. Millor, H.E. Butler, and C.N.L. Brooke, 2 vols. 
(Oxford, 1955-1979), ii, 593, no. 277; for some spectacular shows of arms in late medieval 
Germany, see Otto Volk, 'Von Grenzen ungestört – auf dem Weg nach Aachen: Die 
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Krönungsfahrten der deutschen Könige im späten Mittelalter', in Wolfgang Haubrichs et al. 
(eds.), Grenzen Erkennen – Begrenzungen Überwinden: Festschrift für Reinhard Schneider 
zur Vollendung seines 65. Lebensjahres (Sigmaringen, 1999), 269, 274; J. Jeffery Tyler, Lord 
of the Sacred City: the Episcopus Exclusus in Late Medieval and Early Modern Germany 
(Leiden, 1999), 129, 140. The relationship between military display and monarchical 
weakness found a striking constitutional expression during the later Middle Ages in the form 
of the Königslager – the solemn military camp that any king-elect of disputed title was from 
the thirteenth century onward required to maintain for a fixed period outside the gates of 
Frankfurt am Main, as a visual display of his legitimacy and support. For this see: Hans 
Weirich, 'Über das Königslager: Ein Beitrag zur Verfassungsgeschichte des 
spätmittelalterlichen Deutschen Reiches', Deutsches Archiv für Geschichte des Mittelalters, 
iii (1939); Volk, 'Von Grenzen ungestört', 271-2. 
 
83 MGH Constitutiones, iii, ed. Schwalm, 568, no. 606; and see Fritz Kern, 'Die 
Reichsgewalt des deutschen Königs nach dem Interregnum: Zeitgenössische Theorien', 
Historische Zeitschrift, cvi (1911), 52-3. 
 
84 See Roland Pauler, Die deutschen Könige und Italien im 14. Jahrhundert: Von 
Heinrich VII. bis Karl IV. (Darmstadt, 1997); Fritz Trautz, 'Die Reichsgewalt in Italien im 
Spätmittelalter', Heidelberger Jahrbuch, vii (1963). 
 
85 See William M. Bowsky, Henry VII in Italy: the Conflict of Empire and City-State, 
1310-1313 (Lincoln, Neb., 1960), where this and other illustrations from the codex are 
reproduced between 50 and 51. 
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86 The chronicler John of Viktring thus recounted how Ludwig the Bavarian, on his 
expedition of 1327, 'entered Italy, to the wonder of many, attended by a noble and 
outstanding retinue of knights of German stock': Iohannis abbatis Victoriensis Liber certarum 
historiarum, ed. Fedor Schneider (MGH Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum, 
xxxvi, Hannover, Leipzig, 1909), 92. His words gain in significance when it is noted that 
Ludwig in fact brought only modest forces with him from Germany: Pauler, Die deutschen 
Könige, 144-64; H.S. Offler, 'Empire and Papacy: the Last Struggle', Trans. Royal Hist. Soc., 
5th ser., vi (1956), 367-7, where Offler numbers the force with which Ludwig crossed the 
Alps at 'a few hundred'. 
 
87 Oswald Redlich, 'Ein oberrheinisches Formelbuch aus der Zeit der ersten Habsburger', 
Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins [N.F.], xi (1896), cited in Heinz Thomas, 
'Nationale Elemente in der ritterlichen Welt des Mittelalters', in Ansätze und Diskontinuität, 
ed. Ehlers, 365. 
 
88 For this language under the Hohenstaufen, see Franz Guntram Schultheiß, Geschichte 
des deutschen Nationalgefühles: Eine historisch-psychologische Darstellung (Munich, 
Leipzig, 1893), 220-22. 
 
89 Die Chronik Johanns von Winterthur, ed. Baethgen, 62, 68. A similarly lurid picture 
is painted by the Dominican chronicler Henry of Herford, in his account of the fighting in 
Milan: Liber de Rebus Memorabilioribus sive Chronicon Henrici de Hervordia, ed. Augustus 
Potthast (Göttingen, 1859), 228. For events in Rome, see Bowsky, Henry VII, 159-70. The 
one full-scale battle which took place during Henry's time in Rome, on 26 May 1312, was in 
fact a defeat for the Luxemburger. 
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 90 For Otto's remark, see Ottonis et Rahewini Gesta Friderici I. Imperatoris, ed. G. Waitz 
(MGH Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum, xlvi, Hannover, 1884), 113; for 
Henry's: Die Chronik des Mathias von Neuenburg, ed. Hofmeister, 83; Die Chronik Johanns 
von Winterthur, ed. Baethgen, 62. 
 
91 Its character is well illustrated by the account of Henry VII's capture of Brescia found 
in the Königsaal chronicle: Königsaaler Geschichts-Quellen, ed. Loserth, 342-3. For Henry 
before Brescia, see Bowsky, Henry VII, 115-27. 
 
92 Alexander of Roes, Noticia seculi, cap. 14, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 160. 
 
93 Königsaaler Geschichts-Quellen, ed. Loserth, 348; and the contrast between German 
severity and Italian softness is then further developed ibid., 348-9. See also Conrad of 
Megenberg, Planctus, cap. 8, ed. Scholz, 28. 
 
94 See MGH Constitutiones, iii, ed. Schwalm, 90, 260, nos 100, 266; and, for further 
examples, Ernst Schubert, König und Reich: Studien zur spätmittelalterlichen deutschen 
Verfassungsgeschichte (Göttingen, 1979), 223-4. A treatise by Dietrich of Niem, urging the 
return of the Empire's rulers to Italy, has the title Viridarium Imperatorum et Regum 
Romanorum (ed. Alphons Lhotsky and Karl Pivec in MGH Staatsschriften des späteren 
Mittelalters, v.1, Stuttgart, 1956). 
 
95 For an influential view of the process at work, see Edward W. Said, Orientalism: 
Western Conceptions of the Orient (Harmondsworth, 1991), esp. 1-28. For 'the other', see 
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Maryon McDonald, 'The construction of difference: an anthropological approach to 
stereotypes', in Sharon Macdonald (ed.), Inside European Identities: Ethnography in Western 
Europe (Providence, R.I., Oxford, 1993), 231-2. 
 
96 Thus John Boswell, Christianity, Social Tolerance and Homosexuality: Gay People in 
Western Europe from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Fourteenth Century (Chicago, 
1980), esp. ch. 10; R.I. Moore, The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Power and Deviance 
in Western Europe, 950-1250 (Oxford, 1987); Jeffrey Richards, Sex, Dissidence and 
Damnation: Minority Groups in the Middle Ages (London, 1990), esp. ch. 1. Richards draws 
heavily on a view of stereotyping developed by Sander L. Gilman, Difference and Pathology: 
Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race, and Madness (Ithaca, N.Y., 1985). 
 
97 Boswell, Christianity, 310-12; W.R. Jones, 'The Image of the Barbarian in Medieval 
Europe', Comparative Studies in Society and History, xiii (1971). 
 
98 See Robert Bartlett, Gerald of Wales, 1146-1223 (Oxford, 1992), ch. 6; and, for the 
European perspective, Bartlett, The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural 
Change 950-1350 (Harmondsworth, 1993), ch. 4. Works adopting this perspective have 
concentrated particularly on the British Isles. Thus John Gillingham, 'The context and 
purposes of Geoffrey of Monmouth's History of the Kings of Britain', in Marjorie Chibnall 
(ed.), Anglo-Norman Studies, xiii (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1991), esp. 106-9; and, by the same 
author: 'The beginnings of English imperialism', Journal of Historical Sociology, v (1992); 
and 'Henry of Huntingdon and the twelfth-century revival of the English nation', in Forde, 
Johnson and Murray (eds.), Concepts of National Identity, 88-9; James F. Lydon, 'Nation and 
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race in medieval Ireland', in ibid. The term 'binary difference' is from Gilman, Difference and 
Pathology, 24. 
 
99 An argument particularly strongly made in Gillingham, 'English imperialism', 392. 
 
100 Thus note the title of Alexander's first and longest work: Memoriale … de Prerogativa 
Imperii Romani (ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 91). 
 
101 For French royalist doctrines in this period, see, in addition to the works noted above, 
nn. 39-41, Jacques Krynen, L'Empire du roi: idées et croyances politiques en France xiiie-xve 
siècle (Paris, 1993); Joseph R. Strayer, 'France: the Holy Land, the Chosen People, and the 
Most Christian King', in Theodore K. Rabb and Jerrold E. Seigel (eds.), Action and 
Conviction in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Memory of E.H. Harbison (Princeton, N.J., 
1969). 
 
102 For Walhen, see Matthias Lexer, Mittelhochdeutsches Handwörterbuch, 3 vols 
(Leipzig, 1872-1878), iii, 649; for an example of Gallici used for Italians, Königsaaler 
Geschichts-Quellen, ed. Loserth, 348. 
 
103 See, e.g., Conrad of Megenberg, Planctus, cap. 13, 18, 32, ed. Scholz, 32, 37, 49; for 
the views of Dietrich of Niem, see Heimpel, Dietrich, 155-6; for Alexander of Roes, see 
below. Some medieval views on the relationship between aristocratic styles associated with 
the French and effeminacy are illuminated in Robert Bartlett, 'Symbolic Meanings of Hair in 
the Middle Ages', Trans. Royal Hist. Soc., 6th ser., iv (1994). 
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104 Conrad of Megenberg, Planctus, cap. 31, ed. Scholz, 48. 
 
105 More than one chronicler saw fit to record, for example, that the king of France, who 
in 1289 was preparing for war against the Empire, drew back through fear of German 
potencia: Liber certarum historiarum, ed. Schneider, 260, 301; Die Chronik des Mathias von 
Neuenburg, ed. Hofmeister, 39-40. For fifteenth-century German views on French lack of 
strenuitas, see Sieber-Lehmann, Spätmittelalterlicher Nationalismus, 291-3. 
 
106 Alexander of Roes, Noticia seculi, cap. 15, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 161. The 
same recent events receive allegorical treatment in Pavo, 191, vv. 263-72. 
 
107 For pride and vainglory in medieval thought, see Morton W. Bloomfield, The Seven 
Deadly Sins: an Introduction to the History of a Religious Concept, with Special Reference to 
Medieval English Literature (Michigan, 1952), 75, 105; for the chivalric reputation of the 
French among German writers, see Thomas, 'Nationale Elemente', 375-6. 
 
108 Alexander of Roes, Memoriale, cap. 18, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 114. The 
French were called 'Francigene, quasi a Francis geniti'. 
 
109 Alexander of Roes, Noticia seculi, cap. 14, 15, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 160-1. 
 
110 For the list-making habit and its roots: Meyvaert, '"Rainaldus"', 749. 
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111 Alexander of Roes, Memoriale, cap. 14, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 104-5; and see 
Leonard E. Scales, 'France and the Empire: the Viewpoint of Alexander of Roes', French 
History, ix (1995). 
 
112 Alexander of Roes, Memoriale, cap. 14, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 104. 
 
113 Alexander of Roes, Noticia seculi, cap. 13, 14, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 160-1. 
Even the Germans' alleged amor dominandi, in Alexander's view a morally neutral 
characteristic (ibid., 159-60), gains a different complexion when it is recalled that Augustine 
had identified libido dominandi with the harshness and injustice of Pharaoh: see Frederick H. 
Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1975), 16. 
 
114 Königsaaler Geschichts-Quellen, ed. Loserth, 347. For a similarly disturbing view of 
German warfare, see Henry of Herford's account of the massacre perpetrated by Henry VII's 
troops, 'raging in the Teutonic fashion' (more quasi Theutonico furentes), in Milan, 'sparing 
neither sex nor age': Liber de Rebus Memoriabilioribus, ed. Potthast, 228. Alexander of Roes, 
it might be noted, had insisted that the Germans were custodians of the Christian sheepfold, 
not its violators: Memoriale, cap. 36, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 146 (figuratively equating 
St Peter's pastoral staff with the Empire, by which the 'ravening wolf' is driven off). 
 
115 Die Chronik Johanns von Winterthur, ed. Baethgen, 130. 
 
116 See generally E. Dümmler, 'Über den furor Teutonicus', Sitzungsberichte der 
königliche Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (phil.-hist. Klasse), ix 
(1897); Paul Kirn, Aus der Frühzeit des Nationalgefühls: Studien zur deutschen und 
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französischen Geschichte sowie zu den Nationalitätskämpfen auf den Britischen Inseln 
(Leipzig, 1943), 45-6, 51-9. 
 
117 Studies of the social functioning of stereotypes are apt to treat them as amenable to 
unproblematical classification as either 'positive' or 'negative': thus Rupert Brown, Prejudice: 
its Social Psychology (Oxford, 1995), ch. 4. The view is also common in the writing of 
medievalists on the subject: thus, on the allegedly 'black and white' quality of medieval 
stereotypes, Guenée, States and Rulers, 65. 
 
118 For the Königsaal chronicler, it was the furor Teutonicus of Henry VII's troops, 
synonymous with boldness in battle, that overcame the Romans, Henry's own furor that 
brought the Brescians to their knees: Königsaaler Geschichts-Quellen, ed. Loserth, 343, 347. 
For further examples of the use, in broadly positive ways, of furor Teutonicus and cognate 
phrases in late medieval German writings, see: Ellenhardi chronicon, ed. Jaffé, 130, 131; 
Annales Colmarienses maiores a. 1277-1472, ed. Jaffé (MGH Scriptores, xvii), 213; Sieber-
Lehmann, Spätmittelalterlicher Nationalismus, 191. 
 
119 Peter Amelung, Das Bild des Deutschen in der Literatur der italienischen Renaissance 
(1400-1559) (Munich, 1964), 41. It might be noted that in Ambrogio Lorenzetti's fresco cycle 
of 1338-9 in the Palazzo Pubblico in Siena, illustrating the character and effects of good and 
evil government, the allegorical figure of furor is placed in company with tyranny, division, 
and war. See Quentin Skinner, 'Ambrogio Lorenzetti: the Artist as Political Philosopher', 
Proceedings of the British Academy, lxxii (1986), 33. 
 
120 See below, **-**. 
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 121 Functionalist approaches, which view stereotypes as tools fashioned to justify 
particular forms of social behaviour or to cope with perceived threats to society, remain 
popular among medievalists: thus, for example, Moore, Persecuting Society, 98; Richards, 
Sex, Dissidence and Damnation, 19; and, for ethnic stereotypes, Menache, 'Symbols and 
national stereotypes', 191. Theoretical treatments have adopted the same standpoint: Gilman, 
Difference and Pathology, 16-21; and, for an influential older study, Gordon W. Allport, The 
Nature of Prejudice (Boston, Mass., 1954), 191. 
 
122 For this and what follows, see Dümmler, 'Über den furor Teutonicus'. 
 
123 G.A. Loud, 'The "Gens Normannorum" – myth or reality?', in R. Allan Brown (ed.), 
Proceedings of the Battle Conference on Anglo-Norman Studies, iv (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 
1981), 106. 
 
124 Conrad Kyeser describes Sigismund of Luxemburg as a perfugus atque furibundus for 
abandoning the field at Nicopolis: Conrad Kyeser, Bellifortis, ed. Quarg, 53. Thomas 
Aquinas insisted that courage was a quality different from rashness as well as timidity, and 
that its essence was firmness of mind: Philippe Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, Eng. 
trans. by Michael Jones (Oxford, 1984), 251. 
 
125 See Jones, 'The Image of the Barbarian', 377. 
 
126 See nn. 97 and 98 above, as well as Meyvaert, '"Rainaldus"', esp. 746-7. 
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127 Cited in Jones, 'The Image of the Barbarian', 398. 
 
128 Jansen Enikel, recounting the campaigns of the young Frederick II, observes that any 
Italian (Walich) who fell into the hands of the king's German troops 'was bound to suffer', 
while Gottfried of Ensmingen states that King Rudolf's French-speaking adversaries were 
reluctant to surrender, knowing that the German custom was not to take prisoners: Jansen 
Enikel, Weltchronik, ed. Strauch, 554; Ellenhardi chronicon, ed. Jaffé, 185-6. 
 
129 For rashness in battle as a German characteristic (accidental slaughter of a friendly 
native in Prussia by German crusaders), see Peter of Dusburg's Cronica terre Prussie, in 
Scriptores rerum Prussicarum: Die Geschichtsquellen der Preußischen Vorzeit, I, ed. Theodor 
Hirsch et al. (Leipzig, 1861, repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1965), 91. For booty (resulting in 
Conradin's defeat at Tagliacozzo, 1268), see Ottokars österreichische Reimchronik, ed. 
Joseph Seemüller (MGH Deutsche Chroniken, v.1, Hannover, 1890), 41, vv. 3060-74. The 
chronicler insisted that for an army to break up in pursuit of plunder was, alas, typically 
German: 'wand leider solhes sinnes / sint die Tiutschen meisteil alle'. For the view that the 
Germans lacked foresight, see below, **. 
 
130 Amelung, Das Bild des Deutschen, esp. 23-4. 
 
131 Conrad of Megenberg, Ökonomik, lib. 2.i, cap. 11, in Konrad von Megenberg: Werke, 
ed. Sabine Krüger (MGH Staatsschriften des späteren Mittelalters, v.3 (ii), Stuttgart, 1977), 
22; and see Sabine Krüger, 'Das Rittertum in den Schriften des Konrad von Megenberg', in 
Josef Fleckenstein (ed.), Herrschaft und Stand: Untersuchungen zur Sozialgeschichte im 13. 
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Jahrhundert (Göttingen, 1977), 314. For the activities of the German companies in Italy, see 
Stephan Selzer, Deutsche Söldner im Italien des Trecento (Tübingen, 2001). 
 
132 Russell, Just War, 27. 
 
133 For Italian views of the Germans, see Amelung, Das Bild des Deutschen; Thompson, 
Feudal Germany, i, ch. 11; for French views, see Karl Ludwig Zimmermann, 'Die 
Beurteilung der Deutschen in der französischen Literatur des Mittelalters mit besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der chansons de geste', Romanische Forschungen, xxix (1911); Max 
Remppis, Die Vorstellungen von Deutschland im altfranzösischen Heldenepos (Halle a.S., 
1911). For further specific examples, see Walther, 'Scherz und Ernst', 274, 281, nos 73, 74, 
77, 134; Black, 'An Accidental Tourist', 182-5; Philippe de Commynes, Mémoires, ed. Joseph 
Calmette, 3 vols. (Paris, 1924-1925), i, 139-40 (describing the domestic habits of the Count 
Palatine's retinue while at the Burgundian court in Brussels). 
 
134 Thompson, Feudal Germany, i, 372; Dümmler, 'Über den furor Teutonicus', 119; H.J. 
Chaytor, From Script to Print: an Introduction to Medieval Literature (Cambridge, 1945), 24; 
Meyvaert, '"Rainaldus"', 754; Zimmermann, 'Die Beurteilung der Deutschen', 281-2. 
 
135 Quoted in Amelung, Das Bild des Deutschen, 42. 
 
136 As examples: Alexander of Roes, Memoriale, cap. 16, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 
109; Conrad of Megenberg, Ökonomik, lib. 2.iv, cap. 12, ed. Krüger, 200-1. 
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137 For views among the Germans' neighbours, see Zimmermann, 'Die Beurteilung der 
Deutschen', 235-6; Kämpf, Pierre Dubois, 84. For German descent from a giant, see Hannes 
Kästner, '"Der großmächtige Riese und Recke Theuton": Etymologische Spurensuche nach 
dem Urvater der Deutschen am Ende des Mittelalters', Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie, cx 
(1991). Alexander of Roes linked the Germans' size to their descent, via indigenous Teutonic 
women, from the giant Theutona: Memoriale, cap. 16, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 109. 
 
138 Something of the tone of what they must have picked up is captured by the chronicler 
Mathias of Neuenburg, who had spent time at Avignon himself, and who reports a sermon in 
which the future Pope Clement VI glossed Ludwig the Bavarian's name (Baurus) as meaning 
'unable to wipe his beard clean': Die Chronik des Mathias von Neuenburg, ed. Hofmeister, 
188-9. See also the fear of Alexander of Roes that his arguments will provoke derisio 
Gallicorum: Noticia seculi, cap. 18, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 165. 
 
139 Die Magdeburger Schöppenchronik (Die Chroniken der deutschen Städte vom 14. bis 
ins 16. Jahrhundert, vii, Leipzig, 1869), 15. The earliest Saxon settlers (whom the chronicler, 
following Widukind, claims came from Alexander the Great's army) were, in the view of the 
native Slavs who named them, 'crazy for strife': ibid., 9. 
 
140 Lupold of Bebenburg, De iure regni et imperii, cap. i, in De iurisdictione, ed. 
Schardius, 333. For further instances of this view (which originated with Fredegar), see 
Meyvaert, '"Rainaldus"', 747; Borchardt, German Antiquity, 67; Alexander von Roes: 
Schriften, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 113 n. 1. 
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141 Anton E. Schönbach, 'Des Bartholomaeus Anglicus Beschreibung Deutschlands 
gegen 1240', MiöG, xxvii (1906), 69; and see also ibid., 79, for the view of the Thuringian 
people as being, in keeping with the name of its homeland, dura and severe against its 
enemies. 
 
142 See n. 20 above. Among the works which treat the rediscovery of Tacitus as marking 
a new epoch in German self-consciousness are von See, Germanen-Ideologie, 9; Simon 
Schama, Landscape and Memory (London, 1996), ch. 2. 
 
143 For surveys of Roman writings on the ancient Germans, see A.N. Sherwin-White, 
Racial Prejudice in Imperial Rome (Cambridge, 1970); Altes Germanien – Auszüge aus den 
antiken Quellen über die Germanen und ihre Beziehungen zum Römischen Reich: Quellen 
der alten Geschichte bis zum Jahre 238 n. Chr., ed. Hans-Werner Goetz and Karl-Wilhelm 
Welwei, one vol. in 2 parts (Ausgewählte Quellen zur deutschen Geschichte des Mittelalters, 
i (a), Darmstadt, 1995). 
 
144 Liber certarum historiarum, ed. Schneider, 241. 
 
145 See esp. Etymologiae, lib. ix, cap. ii, in Sancti Isidori Hispalensis Episcopi, Opera 
Omnia (J.-P. Migne, Patrologiae Cursus Completus: Series Latina Prior, lxxxii, Paris, 1878), 
337-8. 
 
146 It is significant that Bartholmaeus Anglicus, whose account of German regional 
geography depended partly on Isidore, singled out for praise those communities, like the 
Rhinelanders and the inhabitants of Holland, who in his view were 'less inclined to plunder 
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and robberies than are other Germanic peoples': Schönbach, 'Bartholomaeus Anglicus', 74, 
75. 
 
147 The urgency of contemporary debates is indicated by the frequency with which the 
violent and disordered state of the German lands found reference in public documents in the 
later Middle Ages. For some examples from the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, 
see Deutsche Reichstagsakten, ii, ed. Julius Weizsäcker (Munich, 1874), 150, no. 63; ibid., 
iii, ed. Julius Weiszäcker (1877), 272, no. 212; ibid., v, ed. Julius Weiszäcker (Gotha, 1885), 
682, no. 470. 
 
148 Lupold of Bebenburg, 'Ritmaticum querulosum et lamentosum dictamen de modernis 
cursibus et defectibus regni ac imperii Romanorum', in Politische Lyrik, ed. Müller, 176. Cf. 
the remarks of 'Meißner' (ibid., 68, no. xiv 2), who describes the Reich as 'orphaned' through 
the greed of the 'German tongue' (i.e. the German people, embodied in its princes). 
 
149 Alexander of Roes, Memoriale, cap. 10, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 100 (echoing 
Deut. 32: 29): 'Utinam Germani … saperent et intelligerent ac novissima providerent!' For 
more on the medieval view that the Germans lacked foresight, see Sieber-Lehmann, 
Spätmittelalterlicher Nationalismus, 192. 
 
150 Conrad of Megenberg, Ökonomik, lib. 2.i, cap. 6, ed. Krüger, 14. 
 
151 For the classical background, see: Clarence J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore: 
Nature and Culture in Western Thought from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth 
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Century (Berkeley, Cal., 1967), ch. 2; Alexander Murray, Reason and Society in the Middle 
Ages (Oxford, 1978), 254-7. 
 
152 Conrad of Megenberg, Ökonomik, lib. 2.iv, cap. 12, ed. Krüger, 201-2. 
 
153 Ibid., lib. 2.iv, cap. 3, 170-1; and see also Krüger, 'Das Rittertum', 303. 
 
154 Murray, Reason and Society, esp. ch. 5. 
 
155 A perception which clearly underlay the remarks of the canonist Vincentius: n. 43 
above. 
 
156 For the association of fury with unreason, Jones, 'The Image of the Barbarian', 377; 
for irrationality as the essence of barbarism, Murray, Reason and Society, 256. 
 
157 See n. 98 above. 
 
158 See Paul Görlich, Zur Frage des Nationalbewußtseins in ostdeutschen Quellen des 12. 
bis 14. Jahrhunderts (Marburg (Lahn), 1964), 146-7 (Bohemians), 200-1 (Poles); Bartlett, 
Making of Europe, ch. 4; Johann Andritsch, 'Das Ungarnbild in der österreichischen 
Historiographie im Mittelalter', in Walter Höflechner et al. (eds.), Domus Austriae: Hermann 
Wiesflecker zum 70. Geburtstag (Graz, 1983), 24-9. Some characteristic German views of the 
Bohemians are illustrated in Königsaaler Geschichts-Quellen, ed. Loserth, 50-1, 266-7. The 
Danes are charged with a propensity for murdering their kings by the thirteenth-century 
singer known as 'Meister Rumelant': in Politische Lyrik, ed. Müller, 84, no. x 3. 
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 159 Alexander of Roes was thus at pains to dismiss as mere juvenility the chivalric 
attainments of the French: Memoriale, cap. 18, ed. Grundmann and Heimpel, 114. 
Alexander's French contemporary, William of Nangis, by contrast, argued that chivalry was 
one of the three elements symbolically represented by the French lily, along with learning, 
and with Faith, which chivalry and learning alike supported: Herbert Grundmann, 
'Sacerdotium – Regnum – Studium: Zur Wertung der Wissenschaft im 13. Jahrhundert', 
Archiv für Kulturgeschichte, xxxiv (1951), 14-15. For German views of French chivalry 
more respectful than Alexander's, however, see Thomas, 'Nationale Elemente', 375. 
 
160 Conrad of Megenberg, Planctus, cap. 18, ed. Scholz, 37-8. For the antithesis between 
warlike valour and courtly corruption in German sources, see n. 68 above. 
 
161 See Heimpel, Dietrich, 157. 
 
162 German humanism's debt to the late Middle Ages is recognized by Borchardt, German 
Antiquity, esp. ch. 5. 
 
163 Die Chronik des Mathias von Neuenburg, ed. Hofmeister, 205-7. Around the end of 
the fourteenth century, the tale was incorporated by the Strasbourg chronicler Jakob Twinger 
into his vernacular universal chronicle, a work which reached a large public in Germany at 
the end of the Middle Ages: Chronik des Jacob Twinger von Königshofen (Die Chroniken 
der deutschen Städte vom 14. bis ins 16. Jahrhundert, viii, Leipzig, 1870), 474-5. 
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164 For the emergence of the infantryman as the emblematic soldier in the visual arts at 
the end of the fifteenth century, see J.R. Hale, Artists and Warfare in the Renaissance 
(London, New Haven, 1990). The genre first became established in German and Swiss art. 
 
165 For a further characteristic example, in addition to those cited above, see Die Chronik 
Johanns von Winterthur, ed. Baethgen, 13: Conradin raised a powerful army in Germany, in 
order to enter Italy. 
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